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EMPLOYMENT OF INFORMANT'S STATEMENTS
IN ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
by

MICHAEL LEvINSON*

The Supreme Court is moving toward a new definition of the
scope of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants,
based an an affidavit which is supported in varying degree by
informant's information.
Situations exist wherein the affidavit contains insufficient
information to support a finding of probable cause thereby invalidating the search warrant. This discussion is limited to an
evaluation of an affidavit's validity under the probable-cause-forissuance test when affiants rely, in part, upon the statements of
an informer.
On the issuance of a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment
sets forth the requirement that" . .. no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized." 1
Further, Rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in part, that:
A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge or
commissioner and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue a warrant ...
There exists some confusion over the meaning of "probable
cause" in the context of criminal procedure, primarily because it
appears as a constitutional limitation on arrests as well as
searches. Probable cause has been defined as the degree of evidence required which lies somewhere between bare suspicion and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 It usually requires personal
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information from others
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to reach his
3
conclusions.
* Instructor of Political Science, Loyola University; Associate Faculty,
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Northwest Campus.
A.B., Roosevelt University, 1962; J.D., New York Law School, 1965; M.
Comp. Law, University of Chicago, 1967. Member of the Illinois Bar.
1 U.S.
2

CONST. amend. IV.
E.g., Dean v. State, 205 Md. App. 278, 107 A.2d 88 (1954); Bland v.

State, 197 Md. App. 546, 80 A.2e 43 (1951).

3 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 179, (1948);, People
v.
.
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Informant's Statements as Basis for Probable Cause
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

To understand the development of the Court's thinking on
the use of informants and their statements in establishing probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the following leading cases shall be examined in chronological order : 4 Jones v.

7
6
United States; 5 Rugendorf v. United States; Aguilar v. Texas;

United States v. Ventresca;1 and Spinelli v. United States., These
cases and their implications pose fundamental questions as to the
sufficiency of an affidavit which relies on the hearsay statements
of an informer.
The 1960 case of Jones v. United States, 0 involved a prosecution for violation of the federal narcotics laws. Here, affiant
stated that he believed his informant's statements "[b] ecause
the source of information ... has given information to the undersigned on previous occasion and which was correct .... "11 The

defendant here, relying on the Nathanson v. United States2 decision as authority, contended that probable cause required statements evidencing affiant's personal observations regarding the
presence of narcotics in the apartment. In rejecting this contention and Nathanson as authority, the Jones Court concluded
that the affiant

" . ..

may rely upon information received through

an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long
as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other
matters within the officer's knowledge." ' 13 Reversing the decision

of the lower court, the Court, through Justice Frankfurter,
stated, ".. . hearsay alone does not render an affidavit insufficient
. . . so long as there was a substantial basis for crediting the

hearsay."14
4 Other lower court decisions where this issue has been raised include:
Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958); cert. denied, 358
U.S. 873 (1958) ; United States v. Joseph, 278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960) cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 823 (1960); Hall v. United States, 279 F.2d 389 (7ti Cir.
1960) ; United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 859 (1962); Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Crews, 326 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 955 (1964) ; United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 882 (1966); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1966) ; Lopez v. United States, 370 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 379 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1967).

5 362 U.S. 257
6 376 U.S. 528
7378 U.S. 108
8 380 U.S. 102

(1960).
(1964).
(1964).
(1965).

9393 U.S. 410 (1969).
10 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
11 Id. at 268.

12 290 U.S. 41 (1933) wherein the Court noted that an affidavit does not
establish probable cause which merely states the affiant's belief that there
is cause to search, without stating facts upon which that belief is based. Id.
at 47.
13 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960).
14 Id. at 272.
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Jones then stands for the proposition that hearsay evidence
may be considered in establishing probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 15
16
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Rugendorf v. United States
fortified Jones by sustaining an affidavit of an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on statements of informants"
who had "... furnished reliable information in the past."

Ap-

parently impressed by the detail of informant's description including number and type of stolen furs - together with independent FBI investigation, the Court concluded that there was
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. In essence, the Court
found sufficient detail for crediting the hearsay.'18 Of particular
importance is the Court's disregard of the basis or source of the
informant's conclusions.
In the same year as Rugendorf, the Court decided Aguilar v.
Texas.'9 Here, the Court retreated somewhat from its pronouncements in Jones and Rugendorf. The affidavit read: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe that heroin ...

and other narcotics ...

are being

kept at the above-described premises for the purpose of sale and
use contrary to the provisions of the law. ' 20 While paying lip
service to the Jones principle that "an affidavit may be based on
hearsay," 21 the Court invalidated the state search warrant because the magistrate was not informed of ".

.

. [1] some of the

underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded
that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2]
some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant.. . was 'credible' or his information
'reliable.' "2 Applying this test, the Court held that the affidavit
could not support a finding of probable cause, thus the warrant
28
and the evidence secured pursuant thereto were invalidated. 3
The theoretical foundation for the "underlying circumstances" requirement first promulgated in Aguilar can be traced
5 It should be noted that Jones does not restrict its "substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay" test to informant situations, but extends its requirement to other instances wherein incompetent evidence (wiretape,
rumor) is considered in establishing probable cause. For earlier cases
contra, see: Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124. (1932) ; Sparks v. United
States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1937); Davis v. United States, 35 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1929) ; Wagner v. United States, 8 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1925).
16 376 U.S. 528 (1964).

1The affidavit contained the informant's detailed description of the
stolen furs along with another informant's statement labeling defendant a
"fence."
181376 U.S. 528, 530 (1964).
Sk378 U.S. 108 (1964).
20 Id. at 109.
21 Id. At 114.
2"Id. (Emphasis added).
28 Id. at 115-16.
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to these prior observations of Justice Jackson:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
24
of ferreting out crime.
It follows from these observations, that if the warrant should
issue absent evidence establishing a foundation for informant's
beliefs and/or a basis for affiant's conclusion as regards informant's reliability, the inference from the facts will be drawn not
by a neutral and detached magistrate but instead by a police
officer. 25
The Aguilar Court further indicated that its rulings were
consistent with Jones26 and Rugendorf. Perhaps the Court in
Aguilar was coining a new phrase for a legal standard previously
established in Jones and Rugendorf.27 At any rate, Aguilar engrafted "underlying circumstances" to "substantial basis."
As a practical matter, both the underlying circumstances
supporting the informant's conclusions as well as supporting his
reliability should be particularly and adequately described in the
search warrant affidavit.
In the next significant case, United States v. Ventresea,28 the
informants were fellow investigators of the affiant, an investigator for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
court's decision, held:
...
where [the underlying] circumstances are detailed, where
[the] reason for crediting the source of the information is given,
and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should
29
not invalidate the warrant ...
Thus, it can be said that the Court equated the Aguilar test of
underlying circumstances with specificity of detail.
Addressing himself to this point, Justice Douglas, in his dissent, criticized the majority:
The present case, illustrates how the mere weight of lengthy and
24 Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
25 See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
26 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
In the Jones opinion, although the informant's
reliability issue was submerged by the discussion dealing with the validity
of an affidavit based on hearsay, the Court did, in fact, conclude that there
was a "substantial basis" for accepting the hearsay. Id. at 271.
27 See text at note 16 supra.
28 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
20 Id. at 109.
The Ventresca affidavit contained a lengthy description
of observations made on seven occasions including such details as the make
of the car involved in transporting illegal goods and the exact places, dates
and times of the observations.
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vague recitals takes the place of reasonably probative evidence of
the existence of crime.
In each paragraph [of the affidavit] the alleged events are simply
described directly, or else it is said that certain events 'were observed.' Scarcely a clue is given as to who the observer might
have been.
The Court's unconcern over the failure of the affidavit to identify the sources of the information recited seems based in part on
the detailed, lengthy nature of the factual recitals ...
The Court of Appeals was surely correct when it observed that
'the affidavit leaves as a complete mystery the manner in which the
investigators discovered their information.' 0
Hence, unlike the affidavits in Jones and Rugendorf, the language of the Ventresca affidavit was carefully couched in ambiguous terms as to the source of affiant's information. Thus
Ventresca diverged from Aguilar by not requiring the "underlying circumstances" or foundation upon which the informant
based his conclusions.-1
The practical effect of the Ventresca decision is that the absence of the basis or source of informant's conclusions will not invalidate the search warrant as long as sufficient detail about the
criminal activities of the accused is presented in the affidavit.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in this
area is in Spinelli v. United States.32 In the trial court, Spinelli
was convicted of illegal gambling activities. Initially, at the
pre-trial suppression hearing, the U.S. District Court held that
Spinelli "lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment objection. ''83 Subsequent to their reversal of the district court's
ruling, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, upon en banc rehearing, sustained the warrant and affirmed the conviction.34 On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed? 5
The affidavit in Spinelli stated, in substance, the following:
At various times affiant and other agents observed Spinelli driving across a bridge between East St. Louis, Illinois and St. Louis,
Missouri and into a parking area next to an apartment building,
walking into the building and entering apartment F on second
floor thereof. The telephone company records showed that
Apartment F had two telephones under a woman's name. Appellant was known to affiant and other federal and local law en30 Id. at 117, 119, 120, 122.

81 This, of course, presupposes that the mere purchase of drugs by the

informant from the defendant was insufficient as a basis for the allegations
contained in the affidavit.
82 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
38 Id. at 412.
84 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd,393 U.S. 410 (1969).
88 393' U.S. 410, 420 (1969).
"
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forcement officers as a bookmaker, a gambler, and an associate
of bookmakers and gamblers. A confidential reliable informant
informed the FBI that appellant was operating a handbook and
accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by
telephones listed for that apartment by the telephone company. 6
Relying on the principles stated in Aguilar, the Court invalidated the search warrant for two reasons: (1) "Though the
affiant swore that his confidant (informer) was 'reliable,' he offered the magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion."
(2) "The tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that
Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation. 3 7 The Court continued, "We are not told how the FBI's source received his information - it is not alleged that the informant personally observed Spinelli at work or that he had ever placed a bet with
him." 3s
Concluding that the Aguilar tests were not satisfied, the
Spinelli Court then went on to apply the "sufficient detail" test
by stating that:
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the
information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip
describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the
magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or 3an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation .
Using the informant's statements in Draper v. United
States"° as an example of sufficient detail required in an affidavit,
the Court commented: "A magistrate, when confronted with such
detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his
information in a reliable way."41 Here, however, the Spinelli
affidavit stated merely that Spinelli was using two specified telephones and that these phones were being used in gambling operations. So the Court concluded that "[t] his meager report could
easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a
' 42
neighborhood bar.'
In this same vein, Justice White, in his concurring opinion,
conceded that to view the informant's statements in isolation
compels the conclusion that the Aguilar standards of under36 Id. at 413-14.

371d. at 416 (Emphasis added).

38Id.
39 d. (Emphasis added).
40 In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) where the factual
setting centered around the transportation of heroin by train from Chicago

to Denver, the informant described the accused's clothing, luggage and
arrival time at a railroad station.
duted without a warrant.
"393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
Id.

Here, the arrest and search were con-
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lying circumstances are not satisfied. 43 Yet, Justice White felt
that the informant's statements coupled with independent police
work"4 satisfied the Draper standard (sufficient detail) and reasonably justified the issuance of the search warrant.
In this writer's opinion, that part of the Spinelli opinion
dealing with "sufficient detail" lacks specificity sufficient for predictability. It can be read broadly to stand for the proposition
45
that unless the informant describes "with minute particularity"
the actions of the defendant, the affidavit is constitutionally infirm, or the opinion can also be read narrowly and limited to its
facts. The only facts supplied in the affidavit were that Spinelli
was using two specified telephones and that these phones were
being used in gambling operations. These facts were held insufficient by Draper standards. Yet, the Draper standards of
detail, like Spinelli's, are difficult to apply to other fact situations. For as Mr. Justice White notes in his concurring opinion:
The Draper approach would reasonably justify the issuance of a
warrant in this case, particularly since the police had some awareness of Spinelli's past activities. The majority, however, while
seemingly embracing Draper, confines that case to its own facts.46
Hence, it seems clear that on the matter of affidavit detail,
the majority opinion in Spinelli casts considerable doubt on the
proper prospective application of this concept of "sufficient detail." Further, with regard to detail and credibility of informant's statements, a sharp division in the Court is evident. 4' Justice Black, after referring to his dissent in Aguilar, further
regrets the substitution of the Court's judgment for that of the
magistrates' and lower courts':
It cannot be said that the trial judge and six members of the Court
of Appeals committed flagrant error in finding from evidence that
the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant here.
It seems to me that this Court would best serve itself and the administration of justice by accepting the judgment of the two courts
below. After all, they too are lawyers and judges, and much closer
to the practical, everyday affairs of life than we are.48
It is difficult to accept Black's argument on this point. The
issue is not solely the propriety of overruling the magistrate's
or reviewing judge's decision, but rather whether the affidavit
48 Id. at 423-29.
44Id. at 422 (Appendix to the opinion of the Court). The FBI kept
Spinelli under surveillance and he was "known to this affiant and to federal
law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker,
an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers."
45d. at 417.
46 Id. at 428-29.
47 In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 120 (1968), Justice Clark joined
by Justices Black and Stewart, disagreed with the majority holding. that
thle test of an informer's reliability is what he says.

Clark believes "WtIhe

officer's experience with the informer is the test and here the two officers
swore that the informer was credible and the information reliable."
46 393 U.S. 410, 484 (1969).
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meets the probable cause for issuance test. Hence, the more appropriate inquiry involving probable cause is whether the informant's tip, even when corroborated by affiant's personal observations, is sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. Despite this, Justice Black foresees the elevation of
"... . the magistrates hearing for issuance of a search warrant to
a full-fledged trial, where witnesses must be brought forward to
4
attest personally to all the facts alleged.1'
Justice Fortas, in his dissent, agreed with Justice White
that the Spinelli affidavit contained sufficient detail to support
the issuance of the search warrant.5 0
Thus, while one group of dissenters, White and Fortas, are
not doctrinally at odds with the majority, but are simply satisfied
with the detail of the Spinelli affidavit, the other group, Black
and Stewart, focus their attack on the Court's interpretation of
probable cause.
For Justice Black and Justice Stewart, Spinelli signals an
undesirable retreat from the principles regarding the standard
of probable cause as stated in United States v. Ventresca:
• .. affidavits for search warrants . . .must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic
fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst
and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of
elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have
no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by
reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before
acting.51
In its application, the Spinelli doctrine demonstrates that
the affidavit must, in compliance with Aguilar, set forth the basis
or source of informant's conclusions or describe in "sufficient detail" the accused's criminal activities. Yet, while the standard
seems clear, its application is complicated by factual vagaries.
Nevertheless, since the Court has consistently attacked the generality of the affidavit and warrant, there seems to be little doubt
that the legality of the warrant is established when: (1) the basis or source of informant's conclusions is adequately stated, (2)
the reliability is factually established, and (3) the accused's activities are described in sufficient detail. Obviously, with regard
to informant's reliability, Spinelli calls for independent investigative activity by the prosecuting officials.
The important theoretical difficulty with the rationale employed in Spinelli is the substitution of "sufficient detail" for
49 Id. at 429.
50 Id. at 435-39. Mr. Justice Stewart in a two sentence dissenting
opinion agrees with Black and Fortas. Id. at 439.

51380 U.S. 102, 108 (1964).
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"underlying circumstances."
Though the Court reasons that
sufficient detail enables the magistrate to draw the necessary inferences from the affidavit, this combination of essentially different juristic concepts must lead to misunderstanding.
For an affidavit to satisfy the "sufficient detail" test, it need
not present either the "underlying circumstances" from which
the affiant concludes the informer is reliable or the "underlying
52
circumstances" upon which the informer bases his conclusions.
Likewise, for an affidavit to satisfy the "underlying circumstances" test, it may lack "sufficient detail."
In summary, of the two juristic concepts "underlying
circumstances" and "sufficient detail" - it appears that the
Court's preference for "sufficient detail," as clearly noted in
Rugendorf, Ventresca, Draper and Spinelli, is stronger by far
than for "underlying circumstances." As a practical matter,
however, satisfaction of either of these tests will probably result
in a finding of probable cause, thereby validating the search warrant.
APPLICATION OF SPINELLI IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Analysis of a few recent illustrative cases, will prove beneficial in determining whether Spinelli initiated a trend in federal
judicial interpretation of probable cause for search warrants
based on informant's statements.53
An example of a broad interpretation of Spinelli at the district court level is shown in Von Utter v. Tulloch.5 4 The defendant was charged with possession of narcotics. The federal district court in Massachusetts invalidated the search warrant and
issued a writ of habeas corpus, partly on the ground that the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, "[did] not
set forth any factual basis to support a finding that the inform'5
er's tip was reliable."
The affidavit stated, with regard to informant's reliability,
the following:
1. Information [was] received from a confidential informant
who is an admitted user and is known by me personally to associate
52 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; United States
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1964).
53 For district court decisions not applying Spinelli, see United States
ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). Here, the

court's holding, structured on the Jones rationale as well as the decision in
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), cautioned against technical

interpretations of search warrants. See also Morales v. Cady, 309 F. Supp.
640 (E.D.Wis. 1970).
54 304 F. Supp. 1055

(D.C. Mass. 1969). Even though Spinelli was
decided after the trial of this case, the court applied it because "Spinelli
represents no substantial change in the law, but is merely a particular

application of principles which the Supreme Court had already enunciated
several years before in Aguilar v. Texas." Id. at 1058, 1059.
55 Id. at 1057.
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47

vith cdn;Victed.Inarcotie users, and the. informant admittedly associates with convicted users,, who have past convictions for narcotic
violations, and who has a user's knowledge of narcotics. 56
The court recognized.that affiant's statement
shows, of course, that [informant] was in a position where it
was possible fbr him to acquire information about Von Utter's
future activities. There is, however, nothing to indicate that the
information -he passes on is trustworthy. There is no statement
that he has in the. past given information which investigation
showed to be true.5
-So, the reluctance of the court in accepting, without more,
on informer's reliability is indeed consonant
"opinion
affiant's
with the rationale,.employedii Aguilar and Spinelli. Yet, there
is a sharp distinction 'between these cases and Von Utter. The
Aguilar affidavit read -in •part, "[a] ffiants have received reliable
"58 The
information from a credible person and do believe
Spinelli affidavit read,' [t].he Federal Bureau of Investigation
has been informed by a confidential, reliable informant that
The Von Utter affidavit, however, unquestionably sets
....
P)59
forth much more. on informer's reliability than either the Aguilar
or.Spinelli affidavits. 0 Attempting to provide:the court with
additional facts and thus a stronger basis for a probable cause
ruling, the Von Utter affidavit is distinguishable from other, less
detailed affidavits. Hence, on the similarity of the affidavits, it
appears that the court's reliance on Aguilar and Spinelli is mis-.

Moreover, fro fa

practical viewpointin narcotics cases, if

the! in firmant usesnarcotics, associates with convicted narcotics
users, and provides information regarding. illegal narcotic activities&, theni even- absent any past history of trustworthiness, these
facts should be sufficient to enable the magistrate to decide that
the idiorma t is reliable..
Because the. Von Utter affidavit set forth more detail upon
..
\"rhich to decide informant's reliability than Spinelli or Aguilar,
the district court's position seems unduly harsh.. However, in
demanding -more facts regarding informant's reliability, the
couit'gsattitude .coincided with the policy underpinnings of the
Sp ineli/approa e h. --A close parallel here can be drawn between
the -Van Uttier.and Spinelli affidavits because of the like recitaVion of facts implicating the defendant, and the failure to indicate
ho.W :the iiformnition ,was acquired by the informer.
Further,. 'after noting Spinelli, the court came to the same
-

56 Id.,at 1056.
.
.
:...Id. at 1057..
58 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109"(1964).

5 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 422 ..(1969).
60 See text at note 55 supra.
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conclusion as did the Spinelli court: there was no indication of

how the informant knew of defendant's illegal activities besides
the informant's association with narcotics as a user.
United States v. Dye,6' another district court decision, demonstrates the use of the "sufficient detail" facet of Spinelli to
validate a search warrant. In this case involving an alleged
violation of the National Firearms Act, the informant observed
a sawed-off shotgun in defendant's house. In commenting

thereon, the court stated:
Spinelli basically condemns a search and seizure on a simple
assertion of police suspicion supported by innocent-seeming activities. Here, the affidavit reveals that the informant saw the weapon
at the location2 described with his own eyes and that it was an
illegal firearm.

The court concluded that a common sense reading of the affidavit by the magistrate would satisfy the probable cause test, yet

other district court cases interpreting Spinelli have emphasized
independent corroboration of information supplied by the informant.6 3
Spinelli has also been cited at the appellate level.6 4

A re-

cent Seventh Circuit decision, relying on Spinelli, validated a
search warrant based on an informant's statements. The rationale behind the holding in United States v. Allsenberrie 5 was
stated as follows:
The Court in Spinelli . . .further defined the first part of the
Aguilar test [underlying circumstances upon which the informant
based his conclusions] by providing that a search warrant based on
an informer's tip can meet the standard of probable cause even if
the basis of the informer's knowledge is not set forth, if "the tip
described the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail so that
the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more
substantial than a casual rumor ***66
As such, Allsenberrie views Spinelli as nothing more than a refinement of Aguilar.
In summary, judged by the aforementioned cases, the direct
61303 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Okl. 1969).
62 Id. at 506.
63
See, United States v. Gardner, 308 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y. 1969);
United States v. Manetti, 309 F. Supp. 174 (D.C. Del. 1970) ; United States
ex rel. Henderson v. Brierley, 300 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Penn. 1969). United
States v. Main, 312 F. Supp. 736 (D.C. Del. 1970). In United States ex rel.
Henderson v. Mazurkiewicz, 312 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Penn. 1969) the court
ruled that both the corroborating evidence and informant's tip were inadequate to establish probable cause. See also text at note 40.
64 Recent federal appellate cases employing Spinelli include; Saville v.
O'Brien, 420 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Melvin, 419 F.2d
136 (4th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Wainright, 416 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1969);
DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969); McCreary v.
Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984 (1970);
United States v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Berry, 423 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1970).
65 424 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1970).
66Id. at 1214.
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impact of Spinelli at the federal level is clear. By taking a
hostile view toward general, unsupported statements of informers and requiring specificity, the courts seek to reinforce the
foundation upon which the issuing magistrate's decision rests.
This goal is to be applauded.
THE LAW IN ILLINOIS
Illinois, like most of the other states, has not been consistent in deciding what constitutes a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay.07 People v. Jackson68 the first notable case in
this area, dealt with a prosecution for unlawfully possessing certain policy paraphernalia and for maintaining a place for policy
playing. In this case, a search warrant was issued on the basis
of an affidavit relying, in part, on information given to affiant
"by an undisclosed person." The defendant contended that the
warrant was invalid because it was based on hearsay. But the
court concluded "It]he simple truth is that the complaint does
not purport to be based on hearsay or conclusions, but on facts
within the complainant's own knowledge, learned while the defendant's residence was under surveillance."69 Obviously influenced by the Jones case, the court, in sustaining the warrant
held in judicial dictum that hearsay may be used to establish
probable cause for a warrant so long as there is a substantial
basis for believing the hearsay.70 Thus, while paying lip service
to Jones, the Illinois Court upheld the warrant's validity, sidestepping the hearsay question.
In People v. Williams,71 a gambling prosecution case, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in reversing the trial judge's order which
quashed a search warrant and suppressed the evidence seized
under the warrant, observed:
[T]he personal observations of another set out in an affidavit are
sufficient to establish probable cause, so long as a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay is presented . . . .the informant was
known to the affiant, and
had on previous occasions given informa72
tion which was correct.
Hence, this decision, like Jackson, after noting the personal
observations of informant, merely reiterates the ritualistic incantation of Jones "so long as a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay is presented. 7 3 Not only does the Williams court
fail to delve beyond the superficial import of the "substantial
67 See text at note 10 supra.
6822

IM. 2d 382, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961); cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985

(1962).

69 Id. at 387, 176 N.E.2d at 805.
7oId.

Ill. 2d 542, 190 N.E.2d 303 (1963).
72 Id. at 544, 190 N.E.2d at 304.
7 Id.
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basis" phrase, but also it blindly- accepts the statement 'informant was known to the affiant, and had. on previous occasion,
given information:which was correct"7 4 - as evidence of informant's reliability.
In People v. York,7 5 the Illinois court, iting with approvaI
the prior Jackson and Williams decisions, had no trouble in finding a "substantial basis," since the informer in York personally
witnessed the activities."
Contrary to Jackson and Williams,
however, the court, by equating informant's personal knowledge
of illegal activities with "substantial basis," took a major step
toward clarifying the Illinois rule to be applied in evaluating
search warrants, based on informant's statements.
In the next significant decision, People v. Williams,7 7 the
court, citing with approval York and the prior Williams case,
validated the search warrant and observed "[the affidavit set
forth personal observations of informers who had furnished re78
liable information in the past."
Therefore, the second Williams case seems to have adopted
the "personal knowledge equals substantial basis" approach promulgated in York and indicated in the prior Williams case.
Hence, in each subsequent case, the Illinois Supreme Court has
79
moved more and more in the direction of a mechanical formula
rather than basing legality upon a case by case evaluation of the
informant's personal observations.
This indulgence of the court in fixed rules is justified as a
means of promoting certainty and ease of enforcement in the
drafting of search warrants. No one will deny that there is a
need for fixed rules in law enforcement, but where a mechanical
application of rules is inconsistent with the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, this can only lead- to -injustice.
Consider, for example, a reliable informer who personally
observes the accused, on some occasions, using a public telephone
that is being employed in gambling operations. Arguably, this
is legally insufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant. Yet, if the Court relies solely upon the informant's per7 Id.
75 29

Ill. 2d 68, 193 N.E.2d 773 (1963).
7 The pertinent section of the affidavit read as follows: [affiant had]talked with an informant who had previously given reliable information
concerning gambling ... [who] . .. had been in-the-above described premiseson four previous occasions during the preceding two weeks and that he had
seen boo kmaking on horse races and poker being played on each occasion.
7736 Ill. 2d 505, 224 N.E.2d 225 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828
(1967).
78Id. at 508, 224 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1967).

79See, Homer, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political

and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. RsV. 96

(1922), wherein this practice is described as the 'mechanical theory."
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sonal observations of the activities of the accused and finds a
"substantial basis" for validation of the warrant, this would be
inconsistent with the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, which of necessity demands that the illegality of
the accused's conduct be determined by a neutral and detached
magistrate and not by the law enforcement officials.
Illinois, however, recently shifted its rationale in People v.
Considine.8 0 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District,
deeply influenced by Aguilar and Spinelli, refused to credit ipso
facto either the personal observations of informant or the talismanic phrase "[a] confidential informant, known to the investigators to be competent, accurate, and reliable told

. .

. ", since the

affidavit failed to set forth the "underlying circumstances" upon
which the affiant concluded the informer was reliable."' The
.onsidine court reasoned that absent concrete facts establishing
the reliability of the informant, even personal observation of illegal activities 2 did not save the warrant from judicial condemnation.
After Considine, the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon
in People v. Dillon-3 to apply Spinelli notwithstanding the failure
of the affidavit to expressly state the source of the informer's
statements, his reliability, or the circumstances under which the
'information was secured. At issue was the probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant to search the defendant's automobile
in which he had been riding when arrested for a robbery.
At first glance, the aforementioned deficiencies in the affidavit seemed fatal. Nevertheless, quoting Spinelli, the court held
.the affidavit to be sufficient because of substantial corroboration
of the informer's statements by the police that certain premises
were being used as a policy station. Facts corroborated by the
police were: (1) that the premises reported on by the informer
had previously been raided by the police, (2) that the informer
entered the premises and returned with a policy ticket pursuant
to police instructions, (3) that at each of three separate periods
of police surveillance, numerous persons were seen visiting the
premises for a'stay of a few minutes, (4) that the affiant police
officer stated that the informer's tips had always been correct in
the past and had resulted in three convictions and four arrests
:pending trial. In the cout's words:
The abundance of substantial corroboration for the informant's
80
107 Il. App. 2d 389, 246 N.E.2d 81 (1969).
81
Id. at 393, 246 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Emphasis added).
82 According to the affidavit, the informant observed the defendant
place..a stolen glass. pane on the front door of a tavern, owned by defendant's
]amiy!
Id, at.91,
N.19.2d 81,
:3.-44-Il.-2d
482,246
256.N.E:2d
451S2(1969)"
(1970),
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report here leads us to the conclusion that this affidavit could surely
have prompted the judicial officer who issued the search warrant to
'reasonably infer that the informant had gained [her] information
84
in a reliable way,' as required under Aguilar and Spinelli.
In short, the Dillon case shows that the Illinois Supreme
Court, on the question of an informant's statements, was concerned with the basis8 5 for the magistrate's determination of
probable cause. Rather than merely equating informant's personal knowledge or independent corroboration of informant's
statements with probable cause, the Dillon approach was to decide on the basis of the affidavit whether the magistrate had sufficient information to decide that probable cause existed. Thus,
it seems that the Illinois Supreme Court was rejecting the mechanical formula approach and returning to a case by case
evaluation.
From a practical standpoint, however, absent the "underlying circumstances" of informant's statements or informant's
reliability, only a description of the defendant's criminal activity
in sufficient detail or independent corroboration by the police
would save the warrant from judicial condemnation.
CONCLUSION

Under federal law, for an affidavit relying on informant's
statements to withstand the "probable cause for issuance" test, a
"substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay must be established.86 A "substantial basis" is established when the magistrate
is informed of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concludes that the informant was credible as well as the underlying circumstances from which informant bases his conclusions.87 A "substantial basis" is also established when the
accused's criminal activity is described in sufficient detail so that
the magistrate can reasonably infer that the informant gained
his information in a reliable way.
In cases subsequent to Spinelli, the federal district and appellate courts have emphasized independent corroboration of information supplied by the informant.
Considering the practical aspects of drafting the affidavit
and warrant, as indicated in the above mentioned federal and
state court decisions, the affidavit, if possible, should detail: what
information was transmitted to affiant by the informant; how the
informant acquired his knowledge of the accused's activities;
84

Id. at 486, 256 N.E.2d 451, 454.

8 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
86 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969).
87 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) ; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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what independent investigation of the accused has been conducted
by affiant and what independent investigation of informant's reliability has been conducted by affiant.
In summation, the basic function of the juridical tests promulgated by the courts is to require the affiant to supply facts in
the affidavit sufficient to enable the judge, and not the law enforcement officials, to determine whether or not probable cause
is established. As such, search warrants and affidavits must be
drafted in light of this objective.
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